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ABSTRACT
The veterans disability compensation (VDC) program, which provides a monthly stipend to disabled
veterans, is the third largest American disability insurance program. Since the late 1990s, VDC growth
has been driven primarily by an increase in claims from Vietnam veterans, raising concerns about
costs as well as health. We use the draft lottery to study the long-term effects of Vietnam-era military
service on health and work in the 2000 Census. These estimates show no significant overall effects
on employment or work-related disability status, with a small effect on non-work-related disability
for whites. On the other hand, estimates for white men with low earnings potential show a large negative
impact on employment and a marked increase in non-work-related disability rates. The differential
impact of Vietnam-era service on low-skill men cannot be explained by more combat or war-theatre
exposure for the least educated, leaving the relative attractiveness of VDC for less skilled men and
the work disincentives embedded in the VDC system as a likely explanation.
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1 Introduction
The di¢ culties faced by many Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans have once again drawn attention to the
fact that military service can have long-term health consequences. Care for injured and disabled veterans
imposes a burden on soldiers, their families, and, in a less personal but still important way, on the government
agencies that provide health care and disability insurance to veterans. These social insurance systems
support almost three million sick and disabled veterans. Veterans Administration (VA) support programs
increasingly serve a relatively young population made up of veterans of post-Korea conicts. Vietnam
veterans constitute the largest group of veterans receiving veterans disability compensation (VDC), with
almost one million beneciaries, about one third of the total. At the end of scal year 2006, the population
receiving VDC amounted to roughly 12 percent of Vietnam-era veterans and 15 percent of Gulf War veterans,
exceeding VDC take-up rates of 5 percent among Korean-era veterans and 10 percent among veterans of
WWII. Moreover, payments to Vietnam veterans have increased to almost half of VDC costs, partly because
Vietnam veterans are disproportionately likely to receive the maximum payment allowed (Veterans Benets
Administration, 2007).
The most visible health concerns for veterans are the long-term consequences of combat injury. Battleeld
injuries can be individually devastating and socially costly for years after a conict ends. Fortunately, acute
injuries are less common among veterans of recent conicts than they were in WWII (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 2006). At the same time, an increasing fraction of veteran disability claims in the past two decades
has been for chronic conditions that were not necessarily apparent on the battleeld. These conditions include
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), hearing loss, and diabetes. Evidence for the importance of PTSD
among Vietnam veterans comes in part from the pioneering draft-lottery study by Hearst, Newman, and
Hulley (1986), which showed elevated civilian suicide rates for draft-eligible men. Among Gulf War veterans,
a large and growing health concern stems from a collection of symptoms with no specic identiable cause
known as Gulf War syndrome. The question of whether military service is indeed the root cause of these
symptoms continues to be debated, but they are usually presumed to be service-connected and therefore
covered by VDC.1
The civilian re-entry experiences of each veteran cohort are in many ways unique, but there are some
striking similarities. The debate over Gulf War syndrome echoes a similar controversy surrounding the rise
in disability claims by Vietnam veteransa rise that accelerated in the late 1990s and continues today. Until
very recently, claims by Vietnam veterans were the source of most VDC claims growth. After 2002, this
growth is partly attributable to the Veterans Benets Administrations designation of diabetes as a service-
1Key studies of this question include Research Advisory Committe on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses (2008) and Medical
Research Council (2003). See also Iversen, Chalder, and Wessely (2007) for a review.
related disability linked to the herbicide Agent Orange (Autor and Duggan, 2008).2 Perhaps surprisingly,
however, much recent claims growth is due to new PTSD claims by Vietnam veterans (Rosenheck and
Fontana, 2007). The recent growth in Vietnam veterans disability claims makes the long-term health
consequences of Vietnam-era service an important contemporary policy concern.
An assessment of the link between Vietnam-era military service and long-term disability also contributes
to a broader understanding of the likely health and social insurance costs of other wars. The Vietnam War
lasted longer and was much more costly in terms of fatality and injury rates than more recent conicts.
Consistent with this, Vietnam veterans are much more likely to receive the maximum VDC benet than
any other cohort. We might therefore expect the health and social insurance consequences of Vietnam-era
service to provide a rough upper bound on the long-term health consequences of military service for veterans
of recent wars. The experiences of veterans from earlier wars provides the best available evidence on the
likely consequences of military service for more recent veterans, a point made in a recent assessment of the
long-run costs of the Iraq conict by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the long-term health impact of Vietnam-era
military service. Because employment is closely associated with health, we also look at veterans labor
force status. To solve the problem of selection bias inherent in comparisons of outcomes between veterans
and nonveterans, we use the draft lottery to construct instrumental variables for Vietnam-era service. Our
empirical strategy relies on the 1-in-6 sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The 2000 Census provides
an exceptionally large sample and, uniquely among large representative samples, contains the birthday
information required to determine draft lottery numbers. Moreover, in addition to the usual labor force
status variables, the 2000 Census long form asks respondents about disabilities along a variety of dimensions,
with a distinct category for disabilities that a¤ect work. Overall, our results show no causal e¤ect of Vietnam-
era veteran status on either work-related disabilities or employment. On the other hand, we nd modest
e¤ects on disabilities that census respondents describe as being unrelated to work.
An important feature of our analysis is an exploration of veteran e¤ects that vary with veteranspredicted
wages and schooling. Recently, Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002), Autor and Duggan (2003), and Duggan,
Singleton, and Song (2007) have argued that high replacement rates (i.e., the ratio of disability income to
prior earnings) have made Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) an increasingly attractive alternative to employment for low-skill men not yet old enough to retire.
Motivated by the possibility of similar interactions with VDC, we look for di¤erences in the impact of veteran
status across quantiles of predicted wage levels and schooling. The results of this investigation show a strong
interaction: although Vietnam veteran status does not reduce employment or raise work-related disability
2The Veterans Benets Administration is the part of the VA that administers VDC and other benet programs.
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rates for Vietnam veterans overall, estimates for veterans with low predicted earnings show a large negative
e¤ect on employment and a marked increase in disability rates (again, mostly for disabilities unrelated to
work). Moreover, there is little evidence that this variation can be explained by variation in the likelihood
of serving in combat or a war zone. In fact, as measured in the 1987 Survey of Veterans, the likelihood of
a service-connected disability is lower for less educated Vietnam veterans. These results therefore suggest
that the causal e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on employment and disability for less educated veterans reect
something other than wartime injuries. A leading alternative explanation is the relative attractiveness of
VDC for less skilled men and the work disincentives embedded in the VDC system.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section uses statistics on VDC and data from the CPS to
identify health concerns for Vietnam veterans and to describe recent changes in their disability status and
employment rates. Section 3 then discusses the descriptive statistics and rst-stage estimates from the 2000
Census that provide a foundation for the draft-lottery-based causal analysis in Section 4. Section 3 also
briey discusses the impact of Vietnam veteran status on mortality, since this is a possible source of selection
bias in our analysis. Section 4 reports overall disability and employment e¤ects and e¤ects by predicted
wage and schooling group. These results show important di¤erences in e¤ects across skill groups. Section 5
discusses the link between schooling and variables related to combat or war-theatre exposure and interprets
the other ndings in the paper. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 VDC and Health in the Vietnam Cohort
Veterans disability compensation (VDC) is determined by the combined disability rating (CDR), which is a
function of the diagnoses for which VDC is awarded. Multiple disabilities are aggregated to produce the CDR.
Veterans with a zero percent CDR get no monthly payment but are eligible to use the VA health care system.
The largest awards go to veterans deemed to be 100 percent disabled. Veterans with a single disability rated
at 60 percent or more, or a combined rating of 70 percent or more plus a single disability rated at 40 percent
or more, can receive an Individual Unemployability (IU) benet if the Veterans Benets Administration
determines that they cannot work by virtue of their disabilities. An IU determination generates payments
at the 100 percent CDR level. As noted by Autor and Duggan (2008), the IU contingency generates a
substantial implicit tax on the earnings of VDC awardees.3
Our descriptive analysis focuses initially on VDC award and diagnosis data for the period 1999-2005
3 In scal 2004, VDC award amounts ranged from about $100 per month for veterans with a 10 percent CDR to almost
$2,300 per month for veterans with a 100 percent CDR (VA O¢ ce of the Inspector General, 2005). There is a much larger
increase in benets in the step from 90 to 100 percent CDR than at other steps. VDC benets are not subject to federal income
or payroll taxes and have usually kept pace with ination. Appendix II of U.S. General Accountability O¢ ce (2006) estimates
that an IU determinations adds about $348,000 to the lifetime present value of VDC payments for a 45 year old man with a 60
percent schedular CDR.
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because this is a time when the Vietnam-era VDC beneciary population was growing and changing in
important ways. The top panel of Table 1 shows that in scal year 2005, over 900,000 Vietnam veterans were
receiving VDC, up sharply from about 736,000 in 1999 (this can be compared to a Vietnam-era population
of 8 million veterans, of whom about 3 million served in Vietnam or nearby). The number of disabling
conditions for which Vietnam veterans received VDC also increased, from 2.76 to about 3.
In scal year 2005, the most widely compensated disability among Vietnam veterans was diabetes, with
almost 180,000 recipients. This can be seen in the lower panels of Table 1, which lists the most common
diagnoses in 2005 and the number of recipients under these diagnoses for 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005.
Diabetes was recognized as a service-related disability beginning in scal year 2002, in response to evidence
of a possible link with exposure to the Agent Orange herbicide used by US forces during the Vietnam War.
The growth in diabetes claims from zero in 2001 to many thousands in 2003 is not a reection of new cases
of diabetes, but rather reects the fact that diabetes was a newly recognized service-related condition.
The most prevalent condition for which Vietnam veterans received compensation from 1999 to 2003 is
PTSD, with about 91,000 claimants in 1999 and 143,000 in 2003. PTSD has long been a health concern for
Vietnam veterans; the incidence of PTSD among Vietnam-era veterans is much larger than that for veterans
of the Korean War, WWII, and the Gulf War. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the number of Vietnam-era
PTSD claimants doubled between 1999 and 2005, long after the war ended. Although the recent increase in
PTSD claims is sometimes attributed to the psychological impact of post-September 11th conicts, Table 1
shows a marked increase between 1999 and 2001 (data for 2001 are from July), and a dramatic jump between
scal 2001 and scal 2003, before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had begun to generate large numbers of
casualties. Moreover, an analysis of veteransuse of PTSD treatment services in the 6 months before and
after the September 11 attacks failed to uncover a short-term increase in the number of veterans seeking
treatment (Rosenheck and Fontana, 2007).
The increase in PTSD among Vietnam veterans has been the subject of a number of government studies,
motivated by the question of whether this increase reects a true deterioration in health or a change in VDC
eligibility screening standards and diagnostic criteria (see, e.g., VA O¢ ce of the Inspector General, 2005 and
Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 2007). A related concern is the growing proportion
of PTSD beneciaries designated IU, which increased from 14 percent in 1999 to almost 30 percent in 2006.
Over one-third of IU beneciaries in 2006 had PTSD as either a primary or secondary diagnosis (U.S. General
Accountability O¢ ce, 2006).4
4This statistic is from Tables 5-9 and page 150 in Institute of Medicine and National Research Council (2007). A report
by the VA O¢ ce of the Inspector General (2005) notes that there is more discretion in IU determinations than in the result of
the CDR rating system. An earlier report along these same lines (U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce, 1987) recommended that
IU determinations be subject to an evaluation by the VAs vocational services division, but this has yet to be implemented.
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Evidence for a regulatory or administrative explanation of the growth in the number of Vietnam vet-
erans receiving VDC comes in part from state variation in average VDC payments. Specically, a major
contributor to cross-state di¤erences in VDC awards appears to be variation in the likelihood that otherwise
similar cases are designated 100 percent disabled as a result of IU and/or PTSD (VA O¢ ce of the Inspector
General, 2005). Along the same lines, the General Accountability O¢ ce found that the number of IU ben-
eciaries was increased by the fact that, beginning in 1999, the Veterans Benets Administration no longer
required IU recipients to submit any kind of paperwork to maintain their IU status (U.S. General Account-
ability O¢ ce, 2006).5 Moreover, around this same time, the Veterans Benets Administration began to
presume IU eligibility in some cases where veterans would previously have been required to actively le an
IU claim (Cooper, 2005).
2.1 VDC and Health Trends in the CPS
A longer view of trends in Vietnam veteransdisability status appears in Figure 1, which shows the average
amount and incidence of VA-source income. These data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and are described in the data appendix. The sample includes Vietnam-era and Korean-era cohorts over the
period 1988-2005. Changes in VA-source income are mostly due to changes in VDC, since the Vietnam-era
GI Bill expired in 1989. Figure 1 shows a marked increase in the average VA income of Vietnam veterans in
the late 1990s, with a further and even sharper increase in 2004. At the same time, VA income levels were
fairly at for Korean-era veterans. As shown in Panel B, the likelihood that a Vietnam veteran received any
VA income also jumped in the late 1990s, though this series is noisier than the average income series. The
notion that increases in the likelihood of receiving VA income come mainly from changes in VDC receipt is
supported by Panel C, which shows the probability of VDC receipt for the same period. This gure closely
parallels the plot in Panel B.6
Direct measures of self-reported disability rates and a measure of poor health, plotted in panels A and
B of Figure 2, also increased in the late 1990s, both in absolute terms and relative to the trend among
non-veterans. This increase may reect a deterioration in the health of Vietnam veterans, but the sharpness
of the break suggests that policy or regulatory changes may also play a role. Consistent with the regulatory
hypothesis, Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2006) conclude that modest changes in medical eligibility
criteria for federal disability programs can have a substantial impact on program enrollment. Regulatory
changes may in turn inuence self-reports of health if these measures are at least in part endogenous in the
sense that they are caused by program use (a point made by Bound and Waidmann (1992) regarding social
5This order was rescinded in 2005 (Philpott, 2005).
6Data for the gures in this subsection are described in the appendix.
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security disability programs). In the CPS, there is a further mechanical link between disability income and
disability assessment since the CPS disability question is a screener for questions about disability income.
As we might expect given the growing importance of IU claims in the overall VDC caseload, Panel A
of Figure 3 shows that the employment rate of Vietnam veterans also dipped in the late 1990s, relative to
the nonveteran trend. Though employment rates should fall as the Vietnam cohort ages, the gure shows a
sharp dip relative to non-veterans the same age, after a period in which veteran and non-veteran employment
rates had moved roughly in parallel. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that this relative decline is associated with a
decline in self-reported health: the fraction of Vietnam veterans reporting that they quit a job or retired for
health reasons ticked up sharply in 1998, and eventually pulled away from the same measure for non-veterans
in the cohort. Following a brief review of related work, our main empirical analysis attempts to determine
whether a causal e¤ect of Vietnam-era military service on health can explain the relative deterioration in
Vietnam veteransself-reported health and employment rates.
2.2 Related Work on Military Service and Health
The question of how military service a¤ects civilian health is of long-standing concern to veterans and
policy-makers. As noted in the introduction, one of the most controversial issues in the health arena is
the proper clinical response to Gulf War Syndrome (Iversen, Chalder, and Wessely, 2007). The growth in
PTSD diagnoses among Vietnam veterans has been similarly controversial (Rosenheck and Fontana, 2007).
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the numbers of men involved and the unique features of each era, the subject
of military service and health has generated a large literature covering each service era back to WWII. A
comprehensive review of these literatures is beyond the scope of our paper, but its worth emphasizing the
importance of selection bias in this context. This selection problem is highlighted by Seltzer and Jablon
(1974), which shows that WWII veterans live longer than non-veterans born in the same years, primarily
due to lower death rates from conditions that would have made them ineligible for service.
A number of earlier studies use instrumental variables in an e¤ort to eliminate selection bias in estimates
of the health e¤ects of military service, as we do here. Bedard and Deschenes (2006) use cohort-dummy
instruments to show that military service during World War II and the Korean conict led to higher mortality
from smoking-related causes, apparently because soldiers had access to free or subsidized cigarettes. On
the other hand, using draft lottery instruments, Eisenberg and Rowe (2008) nd no evidence of a lasting
increase in smoking by Vietnam veterans (who did not get as large a cigarette subsidy as WWII veterans).
The pioneering study by Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986) presents evidence for excess suicide and motor
vehicle death rates among draft-eligible men. Excess mortality from these causes might be due to PTSD.
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But a re-analysis of the HNH data by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) is less conclusive. Similarly, also
using draft-lottery instruments, Dobkin and Shabani (2006) found no clear link between Vietnam-era service
and a range of health outcomes measured in the National Health Interview Survey.7
3 Census Data and the Draft-Lottery First-Stage
3.1 The 2000 Census 1-in-6 File
The 2000 long-form census sample includes approximately one-sixth of U.S. households.8 For the purposes of
this study, we created an extract from this sample consisting of U.S.-born men residing in the 50 States and
the District of Columbia, born between 1948 and 1952. The cohorts of 19-year-olds at risk of conscription
in the draft lotteries were born from 1950-52. Men born in 1948 and 1949 were also a¤ected by the 1970
lottery, so our extract includes these two birth years as well. The estimation sample contains more than 1.14
million whites and about 155,000 nonwhites.
Roughly 31 percent of men born 1948 to 1952 served in the Vietnam era and about 44 percent were
draft-eligible. The average age in the cohort is 49. These and other descriptive statistics appear in Table
2, which reports means by veteran status and race (means for whites appear in Panel A and means for
nonwhites appear in Panel B). Many men report having some kind of disabilityabout 20 percent of whites
and a third of nonwhites. The proportions of whites and nonwhites with a disability related to work are 12
percent and 21 percent, while the proportion reporting other disabilitiesnot related to workis 7 percent for
whites and 12 percent for nonwhites. The work and non-work disability variables dened here are mutually
exclusive, so the overall disability rate is the sum of the two rates.
White veterans have somewhat higher disability rates than non-veterans, while disability rates di¤er
little by veteran status for nonwhites.9 Table 2 also shows that both white and nonwhite veterans are
much more likely to report having income in a category that includes VDC. This is coded from an other
income question that asks about sources of income received regularly such as veterans (VA) payments,
unemployment compensation, child support, or alimony. Since our all-male sample probably has no income
7Other draft lottery studies include Goldberg, Richards, Andserson, and Rodin (1991), who found no evidence of increased
alcohol consumption among draft-eligible men and Hearst, Buehler, Newman, and Rutherford (1991), who found no increase in
AIDS among draft-eligible men, although many Vietnam veterans stationed overseas were thought to have experimented with
intravenous drugs.
8The 1-in-6 long form sample is the basis for the publicly available PUMS les. These les, documented in US Census Bureau
(2005), are simple random samples drawn from the 1-in-6 le, though the 1-in-6 le is not a simple random sample from the
census sampling frame. Rather, the Census Bureau reduces the sampling rate in more densely populated areas. Adjustment for
variation in sampling rates is made here by using the weighting variables that are included in the long-form le. These weights
adjust for non-response and for non-random sampling, and are designed to match external population totals by age, race, sex
and Hispanic origin. In practice, weighting matters little for our results.
9The work-related disability questions asks: Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting 6 months or
more, does this person have any di¢ culty working at a job or business? The complete set of 2000 Census disability questions
appears in the data appendix.
7
from child support or alimony, and employment rates di¤er little by veteran status for whites and are higher
for nonwhite veterans, the other income di¤erential by veteran status is most likely due to VDC.10 In
our sample, about 11 percent of white veterans have other income, a sharp contrast to the 3.7 percent of
nonveterans who have this sort of income. Among nonwhites, 14 percent of veterans and 5.2 percent of
nonveterans have other income.
The same panel in Table 2 gives statistics on veterans and nonveterans with Social Security income as
measured by two variables, one for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and one for Social Security Income
excluding SSI. Since Vietnam-era cohorts are too young to have retired, and are unlikely to qualify for
benets under the means-tested SSI program, their Social Security income is mostly from Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI). The proportion of veterans and nonveterans with Social Security income other
than SSI is about 3.5 percent for whites and 6 percent for nonwhites, while the proportions receiving SSI are
1.3 percent for white veterans and 1.9 percent for white nonveterans. Nonwhite veterans are also less likely
to receive SSI than nonwhite nonveterans (2.9 percent compared to 5.1 percent). Finally, we constructed an
indicator for men who receive any federal transferseither other income, Social Security income, or SSI. Not
surprisingly, given the other income di¤erential, both white and nonwhite veterans are much more likely to
have federal transfer income of some sort.11
Table 2 also reports statistics for the specic types of disabilities identied in the census. The incidence
of each type of disability is slightly higher for white veterans than for white nonveterans, while the di¤erence
in specic disability rates by veteran status is small for nonwhites. Among veterans, the most commonly
reported disability is related to mobility (identied in a question asking about going outside the home alone
to shop or visit a doctors o¢ ce). The second most common disability is associated with restricted physical
activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying. Mental disabilities are recorded in
response to a question about di¢ culty learning, remembering, or concentrating. This is the third most
common type of impairment.
Finally, the table shows descriptive statistics for two labor force status variables that might be related
to self-reported disability status, not working (one minus employment) and not in the labor force. White
veterans and non-veterans are about equally likely to be working or in the labor force. Among nonwhites,
veterans work more.
10 Income from military disability pensions received directly from the defense department is most likely captured by another
census variable that asks about retirement, survivor, or disability pensions excluding Social Security. The other income variable
might also include payments received under the GI Bill, but few veterans in our cohort were likely to have still been active in
GI Bill supported training. Vietnam-era GI Bill eligibility expired in 1989. The 2000 Census income questions used in our
study appear in the data appendix.
11Eligible claimants can receive both VDC and SSDI benets without any reduction from either program; see Autor and
Duggan (2008). In 2005, about 61 percent of VDC claimants with an IU rating received SSDI (Christensen, McMahon, Schaefer,
Jaditz, and Harris, 2007). Few veterans receive SSI because SSI is means tested and because most veterans have a work history
that qualies them for the more generous SSDI program.
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3.2 The Draft-Lottery First Stage
The rst draft lottery, held in December 1969, a¤ected men born in 1944-50 who were at risk of conscription
in 1970, while subsequent draft lotteries involved 19-year-olds only. Men born in 1951 were at risk of
conscription in 1971 and men born in 1952 were at risk of conscription in 1972. Men born in 1953 were
assigned lottery numbers in 1972, but there were no draft calls in 1973. Although men as old as 26 could
have been drafted as a result of the 1970 lottery, the risk of conscription for all cohorts a¤ected by a lottery
was limited to a single year.
Each lottery was associated with a draft-eligibility ceiling or cut-o¤. Men with an RSN below the ceiling
were draft-eligible while men with an RSN above the ceiling were draft-exempt. The draft-eligibility ceiling
was 195 in the 1970 lottery, 125 in the 1971 lottery, and 95 in the 1972 lottery. Draft eligibility is highly
correlated with Vietnam-era veteran status, but the link is far from deterministic. Many men with draft
lottery numbers below the ceiling were able to avoid conscription through an occupational or educational
deferment, or because of poor health or low test scores, while many with lottery numbers above the ceiling
volunteered for service. Throughout the Vietnam era (1964-1975), most soldiers were volunteers.
In the sample of men born 1948-52, the e¤ect of draft eligibility on Vietnam-era veteran status is .112
for whites and .072 for nonwhites. These and other draft-eligibility e¤ects are reported in the rst rows of
Table 3 (Panel A for whites and Panel B for nonwhites). Draft-eligibility e¤ects for men born 1944-47 (not
reported here) are small so we omit these cohorts.
Our primary IV strategy uses a draft-eligibility dummy as an instrument for veteran status. However, in
an e¤ort to produce more e¢ cient 2SLS estimates by exploiting within-eligibility changes in the probability of
enlistment, we also work with an instrument set constructed from ve lottery-number groups and interactions
of these groups with year of birth (an instrument set we call 5zx). The rst column in each panel of Table
3 report estimates of the lottery-group rst stage in pooled samples.12 For example, column 1 shows that
men born 1948-52 with RSNs up to 95 were .128 more likely to serve than men with RSNs above 230 (the
reference group). The next group, with RSNs 96-125, was .082 more likely to serve than the reference group;
the next group was .058 more likely to serve; the next group after that was .044 more likely to serve; and
the last group with RSNs 196-230 was .0059 more likely to serve. All of these rst-stage e¤ects are precisely
estimated and signicantly di¤erent from zero. As with the draft-eligibility e¤ects, estimates of lottery group
e¤ects are consistently smaller for nonwhites than for whites. F -statistics in the pooled 1948-52 sample range
from 134 for nonwhites to nearly 2300 for whites. The 5zx rst stage appears in columns 2-6 of Table 3.
Partial F -statistics for the marginal contribution of 5zx in a model that includes lottery-group main e¤ects
12The estimates in Table 3 and the second-stage estimates that follow control for year of birth, state of birth, and month of
birth.
9
are on the order of 150 for whites and 10 for nonwhites.13
3.3 Mortality and Survivor Bias in the Census Sample
As a preliminary step, we looked for under-representation of draft-eligible men in the census sample. This
analysis is motivated by the possibility that draft-eligible men were more likely to have been killed in wartime
and because the link between Vietnam-era service and civilian mortality is the focus of the Hearst, Newman,
and Hulley (1986) draft-lottery study of the long-term consequences of Vietnam-era service. Following the
mortality investigation, which generates little evidence of an impact of Vietnam-era service on mortality, we
look at the e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on self-reported disability rates and labor force status.
Mortality e¤ects are of interest both as an important health outcome and because excess mortality
among draft-eligible men may induce selection bias in samples of survivors. The two most likely channels
for excess mortality among draft-eligible men are war-related deaths and elevated post-service mortality.
The latter may be due to physical injury, PTSD, or other long-term consequences of military service, such
as an increased likelihood of cigarette smoking (as found by Bedard and Deschenes (2006) for World War
II veterans). The excess deaths in the Hearst, Newman and Hulley (1986) study are due to suicide and
motor-vehicle accidents, both causes that have been linked to PTSD.
Roughly 47,000 men died as a result of hostile action in the Vietnam Era (1964-75) while 8.7 million
personnel served in the military during this period for an overall casualty rate of about half a percent.
Overall casualty rates among Vietnam-era veterans were low, in part because less than half of active duty
personnel served in Indochina, and because many of the men who did served in positions not exposed to
combat. Although casualty rates among draftees were higher than the overall Vietnam era death rate,
draftees accounted for a minority of combat deaths. It is also noteworthy that over 80 percent of combat
deaths occurred before 1970.14 It therefore seems unlikely that war-related deaths have a large e¤ect on the
composition of the sample used in our study.
As a simple check on the possibility of mortality-related selection bias, we compared the actual and
expected numbers of draft-eligible men in the 2000 Census by race and year of birth. The expected ratio
was computed using monthly birth totals for males by race (Vital Statistics Division, 1948-1955), assuming
birthdays (and hence lottery numbers) are uniformly distributed within a month. On the whole, draft-eligible
men are represented in the census sample almost exactly as predicted, assuming a uniform distribution of
13A larger instrument set with dummies for RSN 1-30 and RSN 31-60 adds little to the precision obtained with 5zx: See
Angrist and Chen (2008) for more on the draft lottery rst stage.
14Service and casualty statistics in this paragraph are from Table 583 in the 2000 Statistical Abstract, available on-line at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec11.pdf. Data on casualties by year are available from the national archives:
http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#year. Statistics on service in Indochina and exposure
to combat are from Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986).
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lottery numbers within a month. Among whites, the predicted proportion eligible is .407, while the empirical
proportion eligible is .405. Among nonwhites, the empirical proportion eligible is slightly more than predicted,
.408 versus .405.
Comparisons by single year of birth for white men born 1948-53, reported in appendix Table A1, show
draft-eligible men slightly over-represented in three cohorts and slightly under-represented in the remaining
three cohorts (one of these is the 1953 cohort, with no draftees). Only two cohort-specic di¤erences for
whites are signicant, and all are small. Two out of six cohort-specic contrasts are signicant for nonwhites,
with slightly more eligibles in the sample than predicted for nonwhites born in 1950 and 1952. Given the
size and sign of this set of comparisons, it seems unlikely that di¤erential mortality by draft-eligibility status
had a substantial e¤ect on the composition of the 2000 Census sample. Equally important, these results
weigh against the view that Vietnam-era service led to elevated civilian mortality.
4 Results
4.1 E¤ects on Disability, Transfer Income, and Work
Our main focus is on the e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on self-reported disability status, disability-related
transfers, and labor force status, all denoted by Yi. The empirical framework for these estimates is the
equation:
Yi = X
0
i0 + 0V ETi + "i; (1)
where Xi is a vector of controls for state, year and month of birth, and V ETi indicates Vietnam-era veteran
status. We construct OLS and 2SLS estimates of this equation, the latter using the rst stages reported
in Table 3. As noted in the introduction, veterans may have su¤ered long-term combat injuries, either
physically or as a result of PTSD. Many Vietnam veterans have also been concerned about exposure to
the Agent Orange defoliant used by American forces. The loss of earnings associated with Vietnam-era
conscription for white veterans (documented in Angrist, 1990) may have also been debilitating. These
health e¤ects should turn up in higher rates of disability for veterans, as captured by census self-reports. In
addition, veterans may be more likely to describe themselves as disabled as a consequence of qualication
for VDC and/or SSDI. This sort of endogenous disability reporting is discussed by Bound and Waidmann
(1992), and Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser, and Rust (2000), among others. Finally, poor
health and transfer income may directly e¤ect employment, though each for di¤erent reasons, as we discuss
further below.
The 2SLS estimates of e¤ects on disability outcomes in Table 4 suggest that Vietnam-era conscription
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induced a small increase in self-reported disability rates among whites. The estimated e¤ects, reported in
columns 3-4, range from .012-.014 and are only marginally signicant. These e¤ects come from an increase
in non-work-related disabilities; the estimated e¤ects on work-related disability rates are nearly zero. There
is little evidence of an increase in disability rates for nonwhites, though the 2SLS estimates for nonwhite
men, mostly negative, are imprecise. Its also worth noting that the OLS estimates show increased disability
rates for whites, while those for nonwhites show a decrease. While the sign pattern of the OLS estimates is
consistent with that of the 2SLS estimates, OLS estimates are especially hard to interpret in this context,
since men with disabilities are typically precluded from military service.
In contrast with the modest estimated impacts on overall disability rates, Table 4 shows a marked increase
in the likelihood that (both white and nonwhite) veterans receive other income (mostly VDC). The 2SLS
estimates here are around .04, which can be compared with a mean proportion receiving other income of
.06-.08. At the same time, there is little evidence that Vietnam-era military service raised the proportion of
men receiving income from Social Security (as noted above, Social Security income in our sample is mostly
SSDI). The estimated e¤ects on Social Security income are close to zero for whites, and negative and not
signicantly di¤erent from zero for nonwhites. The estimated e¤ects on an indicator for having any federal
transfers are generally similar to the e¤ects on an indicator for other income, reecting the absence of an
overall e¤ect on Social Security income and SSI (results for the latter are not shown in the table).
The largest and most consistent result coming out of an analysis of e¤ects on specic disabilities is an
increase in the likelihood of a vision or hearing-related problem. These e¤ects, reported in panel C of Table
4, range from .011 for whites to .039 for nonwhites, and both are statistically signicant at conventional
levels. This increase might reect an increased incidence of hearing loss or tinnitus among veterans. On the
other hand, Vietnam-era service does not appear to have worsened mental health, at least, not as reected
in the rate at which men report di¢ culties learning, remembering, or concentrating. This is surprising
given the large numbers of Vietnam veterans receiving VDC for PTSD and the fact that such di¢ culties are
recognized PTSD symptoms (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 2007).
Although, the increased receipt of other (VDC) income documented in Table 4 is partly a mechanical
phenomenon due to the fact that only veterans are eligible for VDC, the estimates showing higher non-work-
related disability rates for whites may reect a negative causal impact of military service on health. But
the pattern of disability e¤ects does not seem consistent with an interpretation of the increase in disability
transfers as the downstream consequence of poor veteran health. First, even if we ignore the work/non-
work distinction, the e¤ects of military service on non-work-related disability rates are too small to explain
the increase in disability-related transfers. Second, the e¤ects on work-related disability are nearly zero.
Finally, the modest disability e¤ects in Table 4 do not appear to have translated into lower employment
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rates or reduced labor force participation, as would usually be expected for disabled workers.
The next section further explores the link between Vietnam-era military service and disability, focusing
on how this link varies with measures of earnings potential.
4.2 Interactions with Predicted Wages and Schooling
The empirical literature on the unintended economic consequences of disability insurance has two themes.
The rst is that such programs increase the likelihood of early retirement. For example, Bound and
Waidmann (1992) and Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003) present evidence suggesting that disability insurance
contributed signicantly to the drop in labor force participation of near-elderly men over the second half
of the twentieth century. A second strand of this literature argues that disability insurance has become
increasingly attractive for (non-elderly) low-skilled men because declining real wages for the less skilled have
meant a rise in disability insurance replacement rates. In particular, Autor and Duggan (2003) nd a close
link between enrollment in SSDI and SSI and regional variation in wage levels. Black, Daniel, and Sanders
(2002) similarly show that disability insurance take-up rates are highly sensitive to regional variation in labor
demand.
As with Social Security disability programs, VDC may provide an attractive alternative to employment
for low-wage men even if their disabling conditions are not serious enough to prevent or limit paid employ-
ment. In support of this view, Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2006) show that enrollment in the VDC
program seems highly sensitive to small changes in eligibility criteria and in unemployment rates. Moreover,
paralleling the incentives created by SSDI and SSI, VDC should reduce work for low-wage men through both
income and substitution e¤ects. Substitution e¤ects arise because many veterans are awarded benets at
the 100 percent level on the basis of an IU determination that depends in part on low earnings.
We explore the link between earnings potential and disability outcomes for Vietnam veterans by looking
for variation in the causal e¤ects of veteran-status across skill groups. If causal e¤ects on VDC take-up rates
and self-reported disability status are driven primarily by deteriorating health, we should not expect these
e¤ects to be larger for men in the lowest skill groups, unless low-skill men were also more likely to have
su¤ered wartime injuries. On the other hand, if VDC is used primarily as an alternative to work for those
with low earnings potential, we should see a strong gradient in the e¤ects of veteran status.
Our interacted models use predicted wages and a schooling variable to dene skill groups. The predicted
wage is the tted value from a regression of nonveteransweekly wages on state of birth and education
interactions, controlling for year of birth. Descriptive statistics for subsamples classied by predicted wage
appear in columns 4-7 of Table 2. Not surprisingly, these statistics show that men with a lower predicted
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wage are much more likely to be disabled and have reduced labor force attachment. In addition, we report
results from an alternative specication using interactions classied by four schooling groups only. This
provides a robustness check and generates a scheme that can be matched to our analysis of combat exposure
by schooling group, described below. As it turns out, the two classication schemes for interacted models
produce similar results.15
The empirical framework for models with interactions is
Yi =
4X
j=1
 
jDij + jDijV ETi

+X 0i + "i; (2)
where the variables Di1 to Di4 are either dummy variables that indicate men with a predicted wage below
the 10th percentile, between the 10th and 25th percentile, between the 25th and 75th percentile, and above
the 75th percentile, or indicators for four schooling groups (high school dropout, high school graduate, some
college [but less than a bachelors degree], and college graduate). The Dij  V ETi terms are treated as
endogenous and a set of four Dij  ELIGi terms are used as excluded instruments in 2SLS estimation of a
just-identied model (Table 4 suggests little precision is gained in over-identied models). As before, the
vector of covariates, Xi, contains dummies for year, month, and state of birth. The coe¢ cients of interest are
1 to 4, the estimated causal e¤ect of Vietnam veteran status on men in each predicted wage or schooling
group.16
The resulting 2SLS estimates appear in Table 5. Column 1 in Panel A shows that for white men in the
lowest wage group, the e¤ect of Vietnam veteran status on the probability of reporting any disability is .118
(the mean disability rate in this group is .4, as shown in Table 1). There are also much smaller, though
still marginally signicant, e¤ects of .037 and .02 on white men with wages in the next two quantile groups,
but no e¤ect on men with high earnings potential. An almost identical pattern arises when predicted wage
groups are replaced by schooling groups, as can be seen in Panel B.
The overall disability e¤ects are decomposed into e¤ects on work-related and non-work-related disabilities
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. Consistent with a similar breakdown in the full sample, the rst row in each
panel of Table 5 shows that the large veteran e¤ect on any disability for low-skilled men is due mostly to
15The sample for the predicted wage regressions consists of male US-born nonveterans born 1948-52. The dependent variable
is the weekly wage and the explanatory variables are a full set of state of birth by education-group e¤ects plus year of birth
main e¤ects. The education groups are: high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate, as
described in the appendix. Wage prediction regressions were run separately for whites and nonwhites.
16The schooling classication scheme also provide a check on selection bias from the possible endogeneity of schooling.
Specically, 2SLS estimates using the draft lottery (reported in Angrist and Chen, 2008) show that Vietnam-era military
service increased the likelihood of college attendance but had little e¤ect on schooling at the high school level or below.
Therefore, draft-lottery estimation of veteran e¤ects conditional on high school graduation status is una¤ected by any post-
treatment selection bias that might contaminate contrasts by college graduation status. This in turn means that the di¤erence
in treatment e¤ects between high school dropouts and the other three groups is not subject to to bias from conditioning on an
outcome variable.
14
an e¤ect on non-work-related disabilities, with no signicant e¤ect on work-related disabilities in any group
(though the e¤ect on work-related disabilities for men with wages in the lowest group is still substantial).
The estimated veteran impacts on both non-work and work-related disabilities are essentially zero for the
highest skill group.
E¤ects on transfer income are generally somewhat larger than those on non-work-related disabilities, as
can be seen in columns 4-6. Moreover, while veterans at all predicted wage levels are estimated to be more
likely to have other income (VDC), the largest e¤ect is again for men with the lowest earnings potential.
The estimated e¤ects on other income in the low skill groups are .073 using predicted wages and .08 using
schooling groups. The e¤ect of veteran status on the likelihood of receiving Social Security income (SSDI)
is smaller than that on other income but still signicant for men in the lowest skill groups. This suggests
that many of the men who leave the labor force to receive VDC also qualify for and receive SSDI (as argued
by Autor and Duggan, 2008).
On the other hand, the results for any federal transfers indicate that SSDI (and to a lesser extent, SSI) is
a partial substitute for VDC. This is apparent from the fact that e¤ects on the aggregate transfer category
are larger than the e¤ects on any single component. For example, veterans in the lowest skill group are
estimated to be about 12 percentage points more likely to be receiving federal transfers, while those in the
next lowest group are a little over 5 percentage points more likely to be receiving a transfer. Disabled
veterans may begin receiving SSDI while they are waiting (or trying) to qualify for VDC or vice versa; the
two programs have separate and independent disability determination procedures. Although SSDI is not
designed to be especially attractive to veterans, all SSDI veterans who apply are required to submit their
military discharge papers (form DD-214). In practice, military service increases SSDI benet levels and
the likelihood of SSDI qualication for men with weak labor force attachment because time in the military
generates additional earnings credits in addition to base pay.17
The last set of results in Table 5 is for the impact on employment and labor force participation. These
estimates, reported in columns 7 and 8, show a marked decrease in employment and labor force participation
among men in the lowest skill groups, with more muted e¤ects in the middle of the predicted wage or
schooling distribution, and no e¤ect for men at the top of these distributions. The parallel between the
variation in employment e¤ects across skill groups and the pattern of e¤ects on disability and transfer income
is striking. Although the employment and labor force participation e¤ects are too large to be explained by
the estimated e¤ects on work-related disabilities reported in column 2, they come out below the e¤ects on
aggregate transfers, a point we return to in the next section.
Finally, Table 6 looks at e¤ects on specic disability types. Here, too, the estimated impact of Vietnam-
17See, e.g., the pamphlet Social Security and Military Service, available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10017.pdf.
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era service is largest at the low end of the predicted wage or schooling distribution, with no signicant e¤ects
at the high end. The largest impact at the low end is on physical disabilities, a category that probably
includes most muscular and skeletal problems (e.g., related to knees or back). There appear to be smaller
e¤ects on physical disabilities in the second-lowest skill group. The second largest set of veteran e¤ects
relates to mental disabilities, for which there are also signicant impacts in the second lowest skill group.
Vision and hearing problems also appear to have been aggravated by military service among men at the low
end of the skill distribution. Thus, within skill groups, the impact of military service on specic limitations
seems broadly consistent with the diagnoses most prevalent among VDC claimants.18
5 Interpreting the Impact of Vietnam-era Service Across Skill
Groups
A natural question raised by the results in Table 5 is whether Vietnam-era service impacts on disability,
transfer income, and employment for low-skill men can be accounted for by di¤erences across skill groups in
exposure to combat or the risk of service-related injury. For example, to be diagnosed with PTSD, a veteran
must establish that he was exposed to traumatic events of an extreme nature (VA O¢ ce of the Inspector
General, 2005, p. 46). We therefore ask whether less-educated men were more likely to be exposed to
combat or war or to have su¤ered a service-connected disability. We explore this question using the 1987
Survey of Veterans (known as the SOV-III since it was the third in a series of veteran surveys). The
SOV-III interviewed veterans (excluding those still on active duty) in CPS outgoing rotation groups from
April 1986 through January 1987. The survey covered roughly two thousand Vietnam veterans and collected
information on veteransservice experiences and health. Most relevant for us, the SOV-III included questions
about service location, exposure to combat, and a direct assessment of service-connected disabilities. The
data appendix describes the criteria used to select our extract, which is a subset of the sample analyzed in
Angrist (1993). Because the results in Tables 4 and 5 show signicant e¤ects only for whites, we focus on
white men in the SOV-III.
Our empirical analysis is structured by an equation linking combat or war exposure and service-connected
disabilities with schooling dummies similar to those in Panel B of Table 5.19 Among all white Vietnam
veterans in our SOV-III extract (a sample that includes men born 1943-57), 40 percent report having served
in the VietnamWar theatre (Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia), 36 percent report exposure to combat, 46 percent
18We also looked at models for log wages as in Angrist and Chen (2008). The estimated e¤ects on log wages, both overall
and within skill groups are essentially zero.
19Denitions of SOV-III schooling groups appear in the data appendix. Schooling group dummies describe education at the
time of the SOV-III survey. The covariates in these regressions consist of 5-year cohort dummies.
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report exposure to combat or war, and 6.1 percent report a service-connected disability.20 To increase the
sample size, our extract includes men born 1943-57, but the descriptive statistics for this sample are broadly
similar to those for the draft lottery cohorts (men born 1948-52), as can be seen in the rst rows of Panels
A and B in Table 7. One exception, however, is the low incidence of service-connected disabilities for
high school dropouts in the draft lottery subsample, probably a di¤erence due to sampling variation in the
smaller sample. We therefore report results for the full sample of Vietnam veterans as well as the draft
lottery subsample.
The regression estimates in columns 1-4 of Table 7 are coe¢ cients on dummy variables for high school
graduates, men with some college, and college graduates, relative to a high school dropout reference group.
The dependent variables are indicators for men who were stationed in the VietnamWar theatre, were exposed
to combat, or were exposed to combat or war. These estimates show little di¤erence in the likelihood of
exposure or service-related disability across schooling groups. For example, the mean rate of exposure to
combat among high school dropouts was about .33 in the full Vietnam veteran sample (shown in Panel A,
column 2), while the combat exposure rates were only 1 percentage point less for men with some college or
a college degree.
Because the largest e¤ects of Vietnam veteran status on disability and employment appear among high
school dropouts, the relationship between high school dropout status and exposure to war or combat is of
special interest. Estimates of this relationship are reported in columns 5-7 of Table 7, which show the e¤ects
of having a high school diploma on the likelihood Vietnam veterans served in the war theatre, were exposed
to combat, or were exposed to combat or war. The estimated di¤erences by schooling group are small for
each dependent variable and none are signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The muted relationship between education and exposure to war or combat does not support the notion
that less educated veterans were more likely to su¤er war-related trauma or injury. For more evidence on this
point, we compare rates of service-connected injuries across schooling groups. (The SOV-III asks specically
about service-connected injuries while the disability variables in the 2000 census are more general.) Columns
4 and 8 in Panel A of Table 7 show that there is no signicant di¤erence in the likelihood of a service-related
disability across schooling groups in the full sample of Vietnam veterans. The comparison across schooling
groups using data from the draft lottery cohorts (reported in Panel B) shows high school dropouts were less
likely to report a service-related injury than were more educated veterans. Thus, the results in Table 7
suggest the e¤ects of Vietnam veteran status on self-reported disability and employment among less educated
20Respondents are coded as having been exposed to combat if they responded yes to a question asking whether they were in
or exposed to combat; respondents are coded as having been exposed to combat or war if they indicated that they were either
exposed to combat or were stationed in war zone; respondents with a service-connected disability are those who indicated they
have been notied by the VA that they are eligible for payment for a service-connected medical condition or disability.
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men in the 2000 Census cannot be explained by a higher risk of exposure to war or service-connected injury
in the low education group.
The results in Table 5 also point away from health per se as the primary explanation for lower employment
rates among Vietnam veterans with low earnings potential. As noted earlier, the e¤ects on work-related
disabilities are too small (on the order of 4-5 percentage points) to account for employment reductions
ranging from 7-12 percentage points (depending on the outcome and skill group denition). It therefore
seems likely that part of the explanation for service-induced increases in disability rates among the low-skilled
is an ex post validation of VDC or SSDI eligibility, a status administratively bound up with employment.
Specically, a veteran who qualies for a federal disability insurance program may be more likely to identify
himself as disabled, even if his disability does not limit work. The strong e¤ect of Vietnam era veteran status
on aggregate transfer income, reported in column 6 of Table 5, seems like the leading proximate cause for
the negative e¤ect of veteran status on employment and labor force participation rates among low skilled
men.
6 Conclusions
Our estimates of the causal e¤ects of Vietnam-era military service on disability rates, transfer income, and
employment paint a complicated picture. On one hand, there appears to have been only a small service-
induced increase in overall disability rates among white veterans, and an insignicant decrease among non-
whites. Moreover, the increase among whites comes entirely from disabilities judged by census respondents
to be unrelated to work. On the other hand, an analysis of e¤ects by skill groups, using either predicted
wages or schooling, shows a sizeable e¤ect on disability among the least skilled white veterans, with some
smaller but still signicant e¤ects in the lower-middle of the skill distribution. There are also large negative
e¤ects on employment in the lowest skill groups.
Did the least skilled su¤er the most serious and lasting health consequences of Vietnam-era service? Our
analysis points away from this interpretation. First, less educated men were not more likely to serve in the
Vietnam War theatre, to be exposed to combat or war, or to have reported a service-connected disability in
1987. In addition, the estimated e¤ects of Vietnam-era veteran status on work-related disabilities are too
small to explain the estimated e¤ects on employment and labor force participation. A case can therefore
be made for disability insurance as a primary causal agent driving these results. Veterans who get VDC
(or SSDI), especially those who are (or aspire to be) classied as individually unemployable, are probably
more likely to dene themselves as disabled and less likely to work. This seems to be a special concern for
Vietnam-era PTSD claims; data from 2005 show that roughly one-third of PTSD claimants are designated
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IU and that IU claimants are concentrated in the Vietnam cohort (Christensen, et al, 2007, Figures 58-59).
Our results have important implications for veterans compensation policy. The number of Vietnam-era
VDC beneciaries grew rapidly in the late 1990s, growth that accelerated in the early part of this century and
has not yet leveled o¤. This imposes a growing burden on a system that must serve new cohorts of veterans
from the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The results reported here suggest the growth in Vietnam-era
disability claims (and hence costs) are not only a manifestation of the health consequences of the Vietnam
war, but also a reection of the incentives embedded in our disability insurance system for veterans.
The results reported here also raise questions about widely publicized projections of the disability costs
likely to come out of current conicts. Specically, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008, pp. 82-83) note that a large
number of VDC claims in this most recent cohort are for PTSD and that PTSD is an especially expensive
diagnosis associated with high program costs and large earnings losses. But the costliness of PTSD claims
comes in large part from the link with IU and the consequent increase in VDC benets. Case reviews in
VA O¢ ce of the Inspector General (2005) show that mental health visits declined by 82 percent after an
IU rating decision, and that many granted an IU determination stop seeking treatment for mental health
entirely, though health care visits for other conditions are unchanged. Likewise, our results indicate that
the employment consequences of PTSD may have as much to do with incentives as with a medical inability
to work, at least in many cases. The complicated links between military service and variables related to
health show that the disability-related costs of conict are driven by policy and regulatory choices, as well
as the battleeld consequences of war.
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DATA APPENDIX
Health and Disability Data in the CPS
Figures 1-3 were constructed using data from the 1990-2006 CPS March Demographic Supplements. All data
were downloaded from the Minnesota Population Centers Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS),
accessible at www.ipums.org. Year of birth was imputed assuming men were born after the survey date.
We categorized Vietnam veterans as all men born between 1944-54 who served during the Vietnam era, as
reported in the variable VETLAST, which reports an individuals most recent period of service. Active duty
servicemen were excluded. Korean-era veterans were identied the same way, except we used the 1929-1934
birth cohort. Nonveterans were classied based on the variable VETSTAT.
The disability-related income variables used in Figure 1 uses the variable INCVET and a dummy for men
who received veteransdisability compensation (GOTVDISA), both in 2005 dollars.. INCVET captures any
income from the VA, including service-related disability payments (VDC), non-disability pension payments,
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and educational allowances. GOTVDISA information is collected only for respondents who received veterans
payments during the previous calendar year, and it indicates whether respondents received VDC.
Figure 2 was constructed from the variable DISABWRK, which codes the response to a question about
disabilities that limit or prevent work. Men with fair or poor health were identied using the variable
HEALTH, which gives self-reported health status. This variable is available beginning in 1996.
The employment measure used in Panel A of Figure 3 is based on the CPS variable EMPSTAT, which
codes as working men at work, with a job not at work, or in the armed forces. The share quitting or retiring
for health reasons in Panel B is based on the CPS variable QUITSICK, which identies respondents who
said that they had ever retired or left a job for health reasons.
All plots show weighted means collapsed by year using sampling weights (PERWT) and including imputed
values. Because income amounts refer to the previous year in the March CPS, Figure 1 runs from 1989-2005.
Disability and health are measured at the time of the survey, so Panel A of Figure 2 runs from 1990-2006
and Panel B from 1996-2006.
2000 Census Disability Questions
We constructed disability variables from responses to the following questions:
16. Does this person have any of the following long-lasting conditions:
a. Blindness, deafness, or a severe vision or hearing impairment? (Yes, No)
b. A condition that substantially limits one or more basic physical activities such as walking, climbing
stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying? (Yes, No)
17. Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting 6 months or more, does this person have
any di¢ culty in doing any of the following activities:
a. Learning, remembering, or concentrating? (Yes, No)
b. Dressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home? (Yes, No)
c. (Answer if this person is 16 YEARS OLD OR OVER.) Going outside the home alone to shop or
visit a doctors o¢ ce? (Yes, No)
d. (Answer if this person is 16 YEARS OLD OR OVER.) Working at a job or business? (Yes, No)
A respondent was coded as having a work related disability if he or she answered Yesto 17(d). He was
coded as having a non-work related disability if he answered Noto 17(d), but yes to any of 16(a), 16(b), or
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17(a)-17(c). The variable any disabilitywas dened as having either a work-related or non-work-related
disability. Specic disabilities were coded as follows: Vision or hearing (yes to 16(a)); Physical (yes to
16(b)); Mental (yes to 17(a)); Self-care (yes to 17(b)); Mobility (yes to 17(c)).
2000 Census VA and Social Security Income Questions
The 2000 Census has one multi-part question that collects information on income by source. We use these
parts of question 31, Income in 1999:
d. Social Security or Railroad Retirement
e. Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
h. Any other sources of income received regularly such as Veterans(VA) payments, unemployment com-
pensation, child support, or alimony - Do NOT include lump-sum payments such as money from an
inheritance or sale of a home.
The response to 31(h) is used to code an indicator for Other Income (mostly VDC); the response to 31(d)
is used to code an indicator for Social Security Income (mostly SSDI); our dummy for any federal transfers
indicates individuals with an amount in either 31(d), 31(e), or 31(h).
1987 Survey of Veterans (SOV-III) Sample Selection
The analysis of the SOV-III in Section 5 starts with the extract of 3,337 Vietnam and later-era veterans used
by Angrist (1993). These data are available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/data/ang1993.
For condentiality reasons, age data in the SOV-III are bracketed in 5-year intervals. The sample used in
Table 7, Panel A is arrived at by restricting to white males with bracketed ages between 30 and 44 who
served during the Vietnam era as indicated by their response to Question 4(c). Finally, the ve observations
with missing education (coded N/A) are deleted to arrive at a sample size of 1893. The sample in Panel B
is further restricted to recoded ages between 35 and 39 for a sample size of 724.
Schooling Group Denitions in the 2000 Census and SOV-III
The analysis in Section 4.2 denes four schooling groups using the highest level of school completed (question
9 in the census). The four census schooling groups are:
1. High school dropout : the highest level completed is at most 12th grade, no diploma (response code less
than or equal to 9)
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2. High school graduate: the highest level completed is high school graduate or GED (response code equal
to 10)
3. Some college: the highest level completed is greater than high school graduate but less than a Bachelors
degree (response codes 11-13)
4. College graduate: the highest level completed is greater than or equal to a Bachelors degree (response
codes 14 and up)
The four schooling groups in the Survey of Veterans (analyzed in Section 5) are based on respondentsan-
swers to questions 15(b) (highest degree before service), 15(c) (highest grade completed), and 15(d) (highest
degree received):
1. High school dropout : the highest level completed is at most 11 (response code 5 or less in question
15(c))
2. High school graduate: the highest level completed is 12 or a vocational program (response code 6 or 7
in question 15(c))
3. Some college: the highest level completed includes at least one year of college but less than a Bachelors
degree (response code 8 or more in question 15(c), but a code of less than 2 in questions 15(b) and
15(d))
4. College graduate: the highest level completed is at least a Bachelors degree (response code 2 or more
in question 15(b) or 15(d))
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1999 2.76 735,627
2001 2.77 749,554
2003 2.88 848,156
2005 3.00 916,220
1999 -
2001 -
2003 135,011
2005 190,199
1999 90,695
2001 106,809
2003 142,876
2005 179,737
1999 50,184
2001 60,753
2003 95,931
2005 129,323
Scars
1999 127,023
2001 125,939
2003 125,534
2005 121,850
1999 82,446
2001 80,586
2003 78,413
2005 78,270
1999 56,231
2001 55,545
2003 66,084
2005 72,169
1999 48,263
2001 53,332
2003 62,821
2005 69,034
1999 67,836
2001 66,335
2003 65,026
2005 62,713
Notes: This table reports the number of veterans receiving VDC in total and for
specific disabilities. The listed diagnoses are the top 10 conditions in 2005,
except for tinnitus (which is often diagnosed with loss of hearing acuity) and
degenerative arthritis (which is not in the top 10 before 2005). Diabetes
recognized as a service-related impairment in 2002.
Source: Veterans Benefits Administration Annual Reports for 1999, 2001, 2003,
and 2005.
Generalized Musculoskeletal 
Conditions
Hypertension
Arthritis (due to trauma)
Knee impairment
All disabilities
Diabetes
PTSD
Hearing (loss of acuity)
Table 1: Veterans disability compensation claims
Diagnosis Year Disabilities per Veteran
Veterans Receiving 
Compensation
All Vietnam veteran Non-veteran <10 10-25 25-75 >75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Draft eligibility (by RSN) 0.437 0.552 0.380 0.420 0.416 0.440 0.443
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) 0.305 1.000 0.000 0.246 0.328 0.350 0.234
Age 49.2 49.6 49 49.1 48.9 49.2 49.3
Any disability 0.198 0.217 0.190 0.401 0.279 0.193 0.116
Work disability 0.124 0.114 0.120 0.253 0.181 0.120 0.072
Non-work disability 0.074 0.083 0.070 0.148 0.099 0.073 0.044
Other income (mostly VDC) > 0 0.059 0.109 0.037 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.045
SSA income excluding SSI (mostly SSDI) > 0 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.102 0.056 0.031 0.014
SSI > 0 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.063 0.029 0.013 0.005
Any Federal transfer income > 0 0.100 0.142 0.082 0.204 0.136 0.098 0.060
Mental (difficulty learning, remembering, o 0.045 0.049 0.044 0.141 0.071 0.039 0.019
concentrating)
Vision or hearing (blindness, deafness, or a 0.038 0.043 0.036 0.080 0.052 0.037 0.022
severe vision or hearing impairmen
Physical (limitation to physical activities suc 0.052 0.054 0.052 0.203 0.127 0.083 0.043
as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting
or carrying)
Mobility (difficulty going outside the hom 0.086 0.101 0.080 0.140 0.084 0.047 0.024
 alone)
Self-care (difficulty dressing, bathing, o 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.065 0.034 0.019 0.010
getting around inside the home)
Not working 0.145 0.154 0.141 0.342 0.219 0.135 0.076
Not in labor force 0.118 0.126 0.115 0.295 0.183 0.108 0.058
N 1,141,905 353,367 788,184 98,541 164,726 574,816 303,822
Draft eligibility (by RSN) 0.440 0.520 0.406 0.430 0.421 0.447 0.447
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) 0.293 1.000 0.000 0.153 0.228 0.349 0.296
Age 49.2 49.5 49 49.0 49.0 49.2 49.3
Any disability 0.332 0.326 0.334 0.447 0.391 0.314 0.201
Work disability 0.212 0.205 0.215 0.273 0.247 0.203 0.136
Non-work disability 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.174 0.145 0.111 0.066
Other income (mostly VDC) > 0 0.078 0.140 0.052 0.067 0.072 0.084 0.070
SSA income excluding SSI (mostly SSDI) > 0 0.060 0.056 0.062 0.094 0.077 0.054 0.027
SSI > 0 0.044 0.029 0.051 0.086 0.063 0.035 0.016
Any Federal transfer income > 0 0.163 0.198 0.148 0.219 0.188 0.155 0.102
Mental (difficulty learning, remembering, o 0.076 0.072 0.077 0.135 0.101 0.062 0.034
concentrating)
Vision or hearing (blindness, deafness, or a 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.070 0.060 0.044 0.029
severe vision or hearing impairmen
Physical (limitation to physical activities suc 0.122 0.112 0.126 0.204 0.167 0.128 0.076
as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting
or carrying)
Mobility (difficulty going outside the hom 0.139 0.145 0.136 0.173 0.152 0.113 0.063
 alone)
Self-care (difficulty dressing, bathing, o 0.042 0.036 0.044 0.068 0.055 0.036 0.021
getting around inside the home)
Employment 0.662 0.705 0.644 0.510 0.433 0.304 0.168
Not in labor force 0.284 0.247 0.300 0.440 0.366 0.254 0.135
N 154,810 45,344 109,466 21,244 30,502 84,180 18,951
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by race and veteran status
ii. Transfer income
iii. Specific disability types
iv. Labor market variables
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for men born 1948-52 in the 2000 1:6 census file. Statistics use census sampling weights.
iii. Specific disability types
iv. Labor market variables
B. Nonwhites
i. Disability variables
Wage index percentile
A. Whites
i. Disability variables
ii. Transfer income
Pooled cohorts
1948-52 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Draft-eligibility effect .112 .058 .074 .133 .138 .168
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
RSN effects (5zx):
RSN 1-95 .128 .065 .088 .154 .155 .173
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
RSN 96-125 .082 .060 .077 .131 .128 .023
(.002) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003)
RSN 126-160 .058 .054 .061 .126 .050 .0084
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003)
RSN 161-195 .044 .044 .054 .102 .024 -.0013
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
RSN 196-230 .0059 .0043 .0062 .013 -.0012 .0077
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
F-statistics 2294 111 202 731 861 1028
Draft-eligibility effect .072 .031 .049 .090 .096 .096
(.003) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
RSN effects (5zx):
RSN 1-95 .081 .039 .059 .101 .101 .099
(.003) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007)
RSN 96-125 .058 .027 .072 .089 .090 .016
(.005) (.013) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.009)
RSN 126-160 .041 .027 .042 .093 .034 .0052
(.005) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.009)
RSN 161-195 .021 .012 .027 .066 -.0047 .0055
(.005) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.009) (.009)
RSN 196-230 .0007 -.004 .018 .008 -.010 -.0055
(.005) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.009) (.009)
F-statistics 134 4.98 14.3 48.9 55.1 47.3
Notes: This table reports draft-eligibility and RSN-group effects on the probability of veteran status.
Draft-eligibility effects and RSN group effects are from separate regressions. Robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses. All models include a full set of dummies for year of birth, state of birth, and
month of birth. Statistics use census sample weights. 
Table 3. First-stage estimates by race and year of birth
By single year of birth
A. Whites
B. Nonwhites
Mean OLS elig 5zx Mean OLS elig 5zx
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any disability .198 .024 .012 .014 .332 -.012 -.061 -.063
(.001) (.008) (.007) (.003) (.040) (.036)
Work disability .124 .013 .000 -.001 .212 -.010 -.045 -.054
(.001) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.034) (.031)
Non-work disability .074 .011 .013 .014 .120 -.001 -.016 -.006
(.001) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.028) (.026)
Other income (mostly VDC) > 0 .059 .072 .042 .040 .078 .087 .034 .040
(.001) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.022) (.020)
SSA income (mostly SSDI) >0 .035 .000 .001 .004 .060 -.007 -.027 -.030
(.000) (.004) (.003) (.002) (.020) (.018)
Any Federal transfer income > 0 .100 .058 .039 .040 .163 .047 .032 .027
(.001) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.031) (.028)
Mental .045 .003 .007 .006 .076 -.007 .015 .011
(.001) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.023) (.021)
Vision or hearing .038 .005 .011 .012 .048 -.003 .039 .036
(.000) (.004) (.003) (.001) (.018) (.016)
Physical .052 .001 .005 .005 .122 -.014 -.008 -.008
(.001) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.028) (.025)
Mobility .086 .018 .009 .012 .139 .005 -.028 -.030
(.001) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.029) (.026)
Self-care .022 .000 .007 .008 .042 -.009 .011 -.001
(.000) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.017) (.016)
Not working .145 .010 .005 .003 .338 -.063 -.001 -.020
(.001) (.007) (.007) (.003) (.040) (.037)
Not in labor force .118 .007 .002 .002 .284 -.057 .026 .016
(.001) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.039) (.035)
Note: This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effects of Vietnam veteran status on the dependent variable listed at left.
All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth, year of birth and month of birth. The estimates in columns 3 and 7
use a simple draft-eligibility dummy as instruments. The estimates in columns 4 and 8 use 5 RSN dummies interacted with year of
birth. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates use census sampling weights.
A. Disability variables
B. Transfer income
C. Specific disability types
D. Labor force status
Table 4. OLS and 2SLS estimates of effects on disability and labor force status for men born 1948-52
Whites Nonwhites
2SLS 2SLS
Any disability
Work 
disability
Non-work 
disability
Other income 
(mostly VDC) 
>0
SSA income 
(mostly SSDI) 
>0
Any Federal 
transfer 
income >0 Not working
Not in labor 
force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
<10 0.118 0.053 0.065 0.073 0.061 0.117 0.091 0.072
(0.038) (0.034) (0.028) (0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035)
10-25 0.037 0.025 0.012 0.039 0.015 0.053 0.037 0.026
(0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
25-75 0.020 0.002 0.019 0.045 0.000 0.041 0.014 0.012
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
>75 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.032 -0.006 0.027 -0.014 -0.012
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
HS dropout 0.105 0.039 0.066 0.080 0.084 0.134 0.116 0.086
(0.050) (0.044) (0.037) (0.025) (0.032) (0.042) (0.049) (0.047)
HS grad 0.036 0.018 0.018 0.033 0.009 0.036 0.032 0.027
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Some college 0.026 0.009 0.017 0.056 0.002 0.056 0.014 0.009
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
College degree 0.006 -0.005 0.011 0.036 -0.005 0.032 -0.006 -0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Notes: Panel A reports coefficients from a regression of the variable indicated in the column heading on dummies for the wage index percentile and their interactions with
Vietnam veteran status, and Panel B reports coefficients from a regression of the variable indicated in the column heading on dummies for education level and their
interactions with Vietnam veteran status. All regressions control for state, year, and month of birth. The wage index was computed from a regression of nonveterans'
weekly wages on state of birth and education interactions, controlling for year of birth. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
A. By wage index percentile
Veteran status 
x wage index 
percentile
B. By schooling group
Veteran status 
x schooling 
group
Table 5. 2SLS estimates of veteran effects by predicted wage and schooling
Disability variables Transfer income Labor Force Status
Mental
Vision or 
hearing Physical Mobility Self-care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
<10 .069 .046 .098 .062 .026
(.027) (.021) (.031) (.027) (.019)
10-25 .020 .020 .032 .012 .019
(.009) (.008) (.012) (.010) (.007)
25-75 .008 .014 .011 .008 .009
(.005) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.003)
>75 -.001 -.001 -.010 -.003 .001
(.005) (.005) (.007) (.006) (.004)
HS dropout .060 .047 .120 .056 .036
(.037) (.028) (.042) (.037) (.027)
HS grad .013 .021 .026 .010 .011
(.006) (.006) (.009) (.007) (.005)
Some college .012 .010 .015 .011 .013
(.006) (.006) (.008) (.006) (.004)
College degree
.003 .006 -.006 .002 .002
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.003)
B. By schooling group
Veteran status 
x schooling 
group
Notes: Panel A reports coefficients from a regression of the variable indicated in the column
heading on dummies for the wage index percentile and their interactions with Vietnam
veteran status, and Panel B reports coefficients from a regression of the variable indicated
in the column heading on dummies for education level and their interactions with Vietnam
veteran status. All regressions control for state, year, and month of birth. The wage index
was computed from a regression of non-veterans' weekly wages on state of birth and
education interactions, controlling for year of birth. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
Table 6. 2SLS estimates of veteran effect interactions for specific disability types
Disability Type:
A. By wage index percentile
Veteran status 
x wage index 
percentile
Vietnam/ Laos/ 
Cambodia Combat
Combat or 
war
Service-related 
disability
Vietnam/ Laos/ 
Cambodia Combat
Combat or 
war
Service-related 
disability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable mean 0.398 0.360 0.462 0.061 0.398 0.360 0.462 0.061
Dep. var. mean for HS dropouts 0.406 0.328 0.439 0.074 0.406 0.328 0.439 0.074
Regression estimates
HS graduate 0.021 0.050 0.054 -0.035
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.033)
Some college -0.059 -0.010 -0.019 -0.002
(0.062) (0.063) (0.066) (0.035)
College graduate -0.081 -0.010 -0.044 -0.007
(0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.036)
HS graduate or more -0.033 0.014 0.004 -0.016
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.033)
F test p-value for education vars. 0.039 0.294 0.071 0.185 0.584 0.818 0.950 0.621
Dependent variable mean 0.417 0.371 0.439 0.053 0.417 0.371 0.439 0.053
Dep. var. mean for HS dropouts 0.404 0.404 0.419 0.007 0.404 0.404 0.419 0.007
Regression estimates
HS graduate 0.072 -0.018 0.081 0.039
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.020)
Some college 0.025 -0.007 0.029 0.054
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.019)
College graduate -0.112 -0.113 -0.100 0.058
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.027)
HS graduate or more 0.014 -0.035 0.022 0.049
(0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.014)
F test p-value for education vars. 0.078 0.461 0.088 0.004 0.893 0.736 0.834 0.000
Table 7. Combat and war-theater exposure by education for white Vietnam veterans
Notes: the table reports OLS coefficients of the dependent variables in the column headings on dummies for education levels and 5-year cohort dummies in Panel A. The
sample in Panel B contains only one 5-year cohort group. The omitted education level is HS dropout. Data are from the third Survey of Veterans (SOV-III), conducted in 1987.
Schooling HS graduate status only 
A. Birth cohorts 1943-1957 (N=1893)
B. Birth cohorts 1948-1952 (N=724)
Theoretical Actual Difference Theoretical Actual Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1948 0.5348 0.5303 -0.0044 0.5358 0.5376 0.0017
(.0012) (.0012) (.0034) (.0034)
1949 0.5358 0.5359 0.0002 0.5354 0.5371 0.0016
(.0012) (.0012) (.0032) (.0032)
1950 0.5376 0.5384 0.0008 0.5371 0.5440 0.0069
(.0012) (.0012) (.0032) (.0032)
1951 0.3424 0.3395 -0.0030 0.3417 0.3427 0.0010
(.0011) (.0011) (.0031) (.0031)
1952 0.2596 0.2596 0.0000 0.2583 0.2650 0.0068
(.0010) (.0010) (.0028) (.0028)
1953 0.2604 0.2592 -0.0012 0.2600 0.2653 0.0053
(.0010) (.0010) (.0028) (.0028)
F(6,∞) 3.74 2.48
Table A1. Proportion Draft-Eligible in the 2000 Census
Whites Non-whites
Notes: The theoretical proportion draft eligible is reported in column 1 for each cohort. Fractions
appear in brackets. Columns 2-4 report the difference between this and the empirical proportion
draft-eligible, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-statistic is for a joint test of
theoretical and empirical equality for all  cohorts.
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Figure 1. VA Income and Receipt by Year and Service Era
Note: Amounts are in 2005 Dollars. Data are from the March CPS.
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Figure 2. Work Disability and Health by Year and Veteran Status
Note: Data are from the March CPS.
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Figure 3. Employment and Health-Related Labor Force Exit by Year and
               Veteran Status
Note: Data are from the March CPS.
